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DEVELOPMENTS
The Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S.
Antitrust Laws and Retaliatory Legislation
in the United Kingdom and Australia
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to curb extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust
laws by American courts, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Australia be-
gan enacting retaliatory legislation in the 1960s and 1970s known as
"blocking statues." This article will briefly examine these laws, the evolu-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws and methods of judicial enforcement of U.S.
antitrust laws overseas.
II. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
The origin of U.S. antitrust law is derived from the passage of the
Sherman Act of 1980.1 With the zeal of what one British scholar deemed
"national religion,"2 the Sherman Act was enacted in an era heightened
by the Populist movement's mistrust of the growing concentration of
American corporate and political wealth.3 Enforcement of the Act
adopted to changing economic realities, as evidenced by the later passage
of the Clayton Antitrust4 and Robinson-Patman Acts.5
Amid a growing world economy, Congress enacted the Webb-Pomer-
ene Export Trade Act,' in 1917. The primary purpose of the Act was to
reduce trade deficits, encourage economies of scale resulting from joint
international marketing efforts and foster combinations of small business
so as to limit barriers of entry into the arena of international trade.' Sig-
nificantly, much of the fervor behind British and Australian reactions to
the Webb Act, and more recently, the Export Trading Company Act of
1. Sherman Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
2. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM 2 (1965).
3. Rowe, Industrial Organization Law in the U.S., in ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80'S 178
(Rowe ed. 1980).
4. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
5. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-136, 21a (1976).
6. Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
7. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT, WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS:
A FirY YEAR REVIEW, 8-14 (1967).
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1982,8 originates in the seemingly relaxed antitrust provisions governing
export trade in these Acts. As one author opined: "[in view of the fact
that American law condones domestic export cartels, the argument that
the Sherman Act must be enforced extraterritorially to protect free trade
in the international would seem hallow."9
The first major international enforcement effort of antitrust laws by
U.S. courts was undertaken in the landmark case of United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of America.10 In that 1945 decision, Judge Learned Hand es-
tablished the "effects doctrine" by stating that "[any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside
its borders that has consequences with which the state reprehends."'
The effects doctrine was applied in United States v. Imperial Chem-
ical." The court in Imperial Chemical ruled that a conspiracy to divide
territories on the part of British and American companies, although oc-
curring overseas, was in violation of the Sherman Act. Since that ruling,
most courts have modified the effects doctrine by holding that it applies
only to anti-competitive behavior having a "substantial and material ef-
fect"13 upon U.S. commerce. A series of recent American decisions has
even begun to affix greater credence to the principal impact of antitrust
enforcement" and its effect on international comity. 5
Despite the more relaxed extraterritorial application of the effects
doctrine by American courts, there continues to be instances where evi-
dence is sought from foreign nationals merely to substantiate antitrust
allegations upon which subject matter jurisdiction is based under U.S.
laws." These so-called "fishing expeditions" may be distinguished from
discovery requests made through an appointed domestic commission or
letter rogatory 17 and pursuant to a formal judicial proceeding, of which
the foreign company is a party, relating to acts by that company within
the territory of the plaintiff seeking the information. Such formal investi-
gations are usually covered by bilateral or multilateral conventions, such
8. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1943, 635a-4, 372 (1982)
and 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003.
9. Sornarajah, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: Conflict and
Compromise, 31 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 127 (1980).
10. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
11. Id. at 443-44.
12. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. N.Y.), final decree, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
13. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., TRADE REGULA-
TION REPORTS (CCH) (p) 70,600 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
14. Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
15. Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
16. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4, 90
Stat. 1383 (1976).
17. A formal communication in writing, sent by the court in which an action is pending
to a court or judge of a foreign country, requesting that the testimony of a witness resident
within the jurisdiction of the latter court be formally taken under its direction and trans-
mitted to the first court for use in the pending action. FED.R.CIv.P. 28.
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as the 1970 Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad.' 8
Despite less harsh application of U.S. antitrust laws on foreign com-
panies, certain American courts and administrative agencies have contin-
ued to champion their ideal of free competition through extraterritorial
enforcement of the Sherman Act and its progeny, "provided [that] there
is some minimal contact between American market and the foreign
conspiracy." 19
The recent promulgation of blocking statutes, or laws designed to
limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, by the U.K.,
Australia, and other nations, can be blamed on the failure of U.S. courts
to realize that the complex political and economic issues raised by anti-
trust cases are more appropriately resolved by consultation and negotia-
tion between governments.
2 0
III. BRITISH AND AUSTRALIAN REACTIONS TO EXTRATERRITORIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS
A. British Blocking Laws
British attitudes toward extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. com-
merce and antitrust laws began to harden upon issuance of the Imperial
Chemical decision in 1951. This sentiment increased when the Federal
Maritime Commission (F.M.C.) attempted to impose American shipping
laws on the British shipping industry. 21 In response, Parliament enacted
the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act of 196422 (Ship-
ping Contracts Act). The aims of this Act were twofold: first, to offer
some protection to British shipowners against excessive claims of jurisdic-
tion by the F.M.C. and U.S. courts; and second, to strengthen the British
position during any international negotiation or arbitration process. The
British viewed the assertion that U.S. law should fill the vacuum of inter-
national trade laws as patently violative of the "rules of international law
concerning jurisdiction and not simply offending against principles of
comity.
'2
The Shipping Contracts Act allowed the British Minister of Trans-
port to prohibit compliance with any foreign request to produce commer-
cial documents, which requests were felt to be an infringement of British
jurisdiction under international law.24 Furthermore, to prevent surrepti-
18. 1970 Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil Commercial Matters,
758 U.N.T.S. 113 (1970).
19. Sornarajah, supra note 9, at 130.
20. Jacobs, Extraterritorial Application of Competition Laws: An English View, 13
INT'L LAW 645 (1979).
21. The British shipping and rail industries are state-owned enterprises that frequently
enter into price-fixing agreements concerning manufactured goods bound for the U.S.
22. United Kingdom Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87.
23. P AL. DEs., H.C. (5th Ser.) 1282 (1964).
24. United Kingdom Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87,
§§ 1(1), (2).
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tious compliance with foreign discovery requests, shippers were required
to notify the Minister of Transport of any such requests or pay a fine of
1,000 pounds sterling for failure to do so.
Despite its innovative terms, the Shipping Contracts Act's jurisdic-
tional infringement requirement became difficult to enforce "in cases
where jurisdiction might have been considered to be concurrent, or where
an activity spanned more than one jurisdiction. 2 5 To further curtail the
abhorred "fishing expeditions," Parliament passed the Evidence Act of
1975.2 Section 2(4) of the Evidence Act generally provides that a person
shall not be required to state what relevant documents are in his posses-
sion, custody or power, nor to produce documents other than those speci-
fied in the Court order as appearing to be documents in a person's posses-
sion, custody or power. This statute was cited by the British Attorney
General in Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. where it was
maintained that "the wide investigatory procedures under the U.S. anti-
trust legislation against persons outside the U.S. who are not U.S. citizens
constitutes an infringement of the proper jurisdiction and sovereignty of
the United Kingdom."2 8 Additionally, the U.K. prohibits certain disclo-
sures of sensitive commercial data obtained by the government under the
Fair Trading Act of 1975.9 As a last resort, the general protections of
"crown privilege" may be asserted by a government minister or by in-
jured private parties, pursuant to a court order, where disclosure would
be harmful to the national defense or to diplomatic relations.2
Fearing a growing ethnocentric trend of U.S. antitrust laws3 ' and in
response to the heavy press following the Seventh Circuit's assessment of
treble damages against several British shipping companies, 2 and the at-
tempt to obtain similar punitive damages against a British uranium pro-
ducer denied access to American markets, 2 the British government de-
cided to take dramatic action in defense of British trading overseas.
Thus, in 1980 the Protection of Trading Interests Act was passed"' as a
"response to a situation of a very particular nature which had been devel-
oping over several decades, and which in the past few years [had] become
25. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM.J.INT'L L. 257 (1981).
26. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, ch. 34.
27. [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81.
28. Jacobs, supra note 20, at 656-57.
29. Fair Trading Act, 1973, ch. 41 under Statistics of Trade Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6,
ch. 39.
30. See Conway v. Rimmer, 1968 A.C. 910 and Burmah Oil Co. v. Bank of Eng., [1979]
2 W.L.R. 473.
31. See ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS 6 (1977).
32. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algon Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See also
973 PARL.DzB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 1538 (1979).
33. Rio Tinto Zinc, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81.
34. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.
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much more acute."35 The Protection of Trading Interest Act superseded
and repealed the Shipping Contracts Act of 1964. The direct retaliatory
nature of the Act is evidenced by a recent comment stating that "[t]he
Protection of Trading Interests Act was passed in retaliation [of] U.S.
antitrust enforcement efforts such as prosecution of the uranium cartel
and of several British ocean shipping companies. . . which were found to
be offensive to British interests."3 6
According to the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill,
the Protection of Trading Interests Act has six substantive provisions.
Clause 1 generally provides the requisite means for the British govern-
ment to circumvent measures taken or proposed to be taken under the
laws of a foreign country pertaining, and potentially damaging, to the
trading interests of the U.K. The Act specifically directs the Secretary of
State (Secretary) to take blocking action if its appears "that those [anti-
trust] measures, in so far as they apply or would apply to things done
outside the territorial jurisdiction of [the foreign] country by persons car-
rying on business in the U.K. are damaging or threaten to damage the
trading interest of the U.K.
'3 7
Once this threshold determination is made, the Secretary may not
only issue specific orders necessary to prevent damage ensuing from com-
pliance with extraterritorial proceedings, but may also require persons in
the U.K., who carry on business in a foreign country, to notify their office
of any requirement threatened or imposed pursuant to antitrust, general
trade or security regulations. If such proceedings are perceived as threat-
ening to British interests, the Secretary is authorized to prohibit compli-
ance with them.
Clause 2 of the Act provides that when a person in the U.K. is re-
quired to produce for a foreign authority a commercial document which is
not within the territorial jurisdiction of the compelling country the Secre-
tary may forbid such production. This prohibition covers all requests for
commerical data not made pursuant to an instituted civil or criminal pro-
ceeding, or of a general discovery nature. These requirements, however,
must be found to infringe upon the jurisdiction or sovereignty of the
U.K., or to be prejudicial to the U.K.'s relations with other countries.
Clause 3 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act imposes fines of
up to 1,000 pounds sterling for an unexcused or knowing violation of the
Act. It should be noted that such fines may be a less drastic penalty for
British companies to pay than would be noncompliance with U.S. anti-
trust proceedings.
Pursuant to proceedings under the 1975 Proceeding in Other Juris-
dictions Act, clause 4 forbids British courts from complying with a re-
35. Letter from the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., to the U.S. Government
(Nov. 12, 1978), reprinted in LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 184 (1983).
36. 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 721 (Apr. 10, 1983).
37. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 1(2).
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quest from a foreign court when the Secretary certifies that the request
infringes upon British jurisdiction or is otherwise judicial to the U.K.
This provision in effect codifies the holding in Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., which permitted blocking of a discovery request
made pursuant to an American antitrust proceeding.
Clause 5 of the Act provides that any multiple damages awarded by a
foreign antitrust tribunal and determined to be detrimental by the Secre-
tary "may neither be registered nor enforced by British Courts."" Fur-
thermore, the Secretary has broad discretion under this provision to des-
ignate rulings as merely "concerned with the prohibition or regulation of
[competition] agreements."3 "
Clause 6 of the Act is a "lawback" provision and allows British citi-
zens or corporations to recover from the British assets of a foreign party
awarded multiple damages any amount assessed above actual damages in-
curred, or treble damages. Neither this nor any other clause of the Act
proscribes compensation for the activities of British companies or their
subsidiaries occurring principally in England or overseas.
Clause 6 has proven to be the most controversial of the six substan-
tive provisions of the Protection of Trading Interests Act beause it per-
mits a "qualifying defendant" to recover, in a British court, against a
successful claimant not otherwise within the court's jurisdiction. Signifi-
cantly, clause 6 provides that "[n]o infringement of British jurisdiction
has to be proved nor is application of the section a matter for ministerial
discretion. It is a definite right to recovery, which courts are obliged to
enforce.
4 0
The capability of clause 6 to nullify antitrust judgments sparked an
immediate hostile reaction in the U.S. Particularly, the U.S. Department
of State questioned the propriety of allowing a non-British corporation
doing business in the U.S. and the U.K., but principally resident else-
where, to sue in British court in order to undo an American court's ruling.
An official Department of State communication also questioned the rea-
sonableness of a law insisting that an antitrust judgment relate to behav-
ior exclusively undertaken within the territory of one state.4'
However, it is the American scheme of allowing enforcement of pub-
lic law in the field of private remedies, through the mechanism of treble
38. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 5(1)- Sep Mirabito
& Friedler, International Antitrust 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1 (1981).
39. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 5(4).
40. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6(5). "Qualifying
defendant" in section 6(5) of the Act pertains to the ordinary residence or place of business
of the defendant and judgments relating exclusively to activities within the forum state.
However, courts are unlikely to allow a defendant to secure the right to such "clawback"
protection by going outside the U.S. to find a course of conduct that was in reality a "do-
mestic operation." See Lowe supra note 25, at 279.
41. Letter from Brian J. Atwood to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Sept. 27, 1979), re-
printed in part in 74 AM.J.INT'L L. 179 (1980).
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damages, that the British vehemently object to. In diplomatic correspon-
dence, Britian took exception to a legal scheme which permits a "plaintiff
to pursue defendants for private gain thus excluding international consid-
erations of a public nature" and further suggested that "where criminal
and civil penalties coexist, those engaging in international trade are ex-
posed to double jeopardy . . . [and] a limited countervailing remedy
should be provided." '4 2
B. Australian Blocking Statutes
Australia was an early leader among Commonwealth nations in the
passage of blocking statutes designed to protect a foreign government's
economic policies from the unwelcome effects of American antitrust judg-
ments. Due to Australia's high level of concentration on and state support
of its natural resources and shipping industries, the Australians took a
decidedly hostile approach to the regulation of the international market-
place by American courts, especially via the effects doctrine. After citing
the decision of In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation" in his address to
the American Bar Association in 1981, Peter Durate, a former Australian
Attorney General, revealed Australian attitudes toward extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws by American courts when he offered
that:
[I]t is not merely that the courts lack the expertise; it is rather that it
is not part of the judicial function to decide whether a law or policy is
justified by what a court conceives to be in the national interest. That
is the political function. There is even less warrant for a court to at-
tempt that task in relation to the law or policy of a foreign country."
In response to American attempts to obtain sensitive documents held
by Australian uranium producers through letters rogatory,' 5 the Austra-
lian Parliament enacted the Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain
Evidence) Act of 1976.4' The Foreign Proceedings Act, as it is known,
allows the Attorney General of Australia to issue directives "to ensure
that documents in [Australia] are not able to be produced to courts or
tribunals in other countries.' 7 Once the Attorney General determines
that a foreign tribunal has exercised jurisdiction in a manner inconsistent
42. Rio Tinto Zinc, [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 85.
43. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
44. Address by Australian Attorney General, Senator the Hon. Peter Durack before the
American Bar Association (Aug. 12, 1981). See Ognman, Is Somebody Crying "Wolf?" An
Assessment of Whether Antitrust Impedes Export Trade, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 163
(1976) for an expression of the perceived hypocrisy of U.S. antitrust enforcement.
45. Note, Shortening the Long Arm of American Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extraterrito-
riality and the Foreign Blocking statutes, 28 Loy. L. REv. 213 (1982).
46. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121, Austl.
Acts (1976), as amended, Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amend-
ment Act, 1976, No. 202, Austl. Acts (1976).
47. PARL.DFs., S. (Austl.) 2186 (Weekly Hansard No. 18, 1976).
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with international law or emity, or detrimental to Australian interests, he
may take appropriate measures to block discovery requests or to prohibit
Australian citizens or residents from producing oral testimony. The Act
has been amended so as to render such orders of the Attorney General
free of judicial challenges.4" Parliament, however, has the power to disap-
prove any order given by the Attorney General within fifteen days of the
order's issuance.
Despite this legislation, U.S. courts persist in their attempts to secure
both documents and testimony pursuant to uranium litigation. Fearing a
succession of damaging default judgments against key uranium producers,
the Australian Parliament enacted the Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Re-
striction of Enforcement) Act of 1979.49 The Foreign Antitrust Judgments
Act of 1979 supplemented existing legislation and vested broad discre-
tionary power in the Attorney General to determine whether an order
should be issued declaring that a foreign judgment not be recognized in
Australian, either in whole or in part. As in the Foreign Proceedings Act,
the Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act directed the Attorney General to
act only when the foreign judgments are violative of international law or
inimical to Australian interests.
The Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act also failed to block encroach-
ments upon Australia's sovereignty resulting from U.S. antitrust enforce-
ment overseas. This dilemma was characterized by one author who main-
tained that:
The Australian government and other uranium producers [were] in an
invidious position. Either they secure[d] compliance with the U.S. an-
titrust legislation, implying acquiescence in an assertion of jurisdiction
not supported by international law, or they export[ed] uranium in ac-
cordance with perceived national interests and risk[ed] the
probability of U.S. prosecution where these export practices violate[d]
antitrust provisions.50
In light of repeated discovery attempts made by American courts
pursuant to uranium and shipping legislation,5 the Australian govern-
ment proposed to its parliament," in 1981, the enactment of the Foreign
Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Amendment Act.
3
The purpose of the Act was to give the utmost protection to Australian
48. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, 1976, No.
202, Austl. Acts (1976).
49. Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act of 1979, No. 13,
Austl. Acts. (1979).
50. Triggs, Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Antitrust Legislation: The In-
ternational Law Implications of the Westinghouse Allegations of a Uranium Producers'
Cartel, 12 MELB. U.L. REv. 251, 280 (1979).
51. See Pacific/New Zealand Shipping Conference Investigation, 43 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 23 (July 1, 1979).
52. PARL. DEB., S (Austl.) 127 (Weekly Hansard No. 21, 1979).
53. This bill was introduced in the Australian Senate by the Australian Attorney Gen-




The three important provisions of the proposed Act were Clauses 4-6.
Clause 4 requires the Attorney General of Australia not to issue an order
pursuant to the 1979 Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act if the conduct in
question took place in the country in which the ruling court is situated.
Going further than the British Protection of Trading Interests Act,
Clause 5 permitted an Australian party to recover all damages, not just
punitive damages, paid pursuant to overseas antitrust judgment against
the initial plaintiff, provided that the Attorney General first ordered that
the judgment was wholly or partially unenforceable in Australia. Further-
more, this "clawback" provision pierced the corporate veil by allowing a
corporation connected to the defendant corporation in the antitrust pro-
ceeding to have the same right of recovery back.55 Finally, Clause 6 pro-
vided that any party resident in a country with blocking statutes similar
to those of Australia, namely Commonwealth nations, may sue to enforce
an overseas antitrust judgment against the original plaintiff, as long as
the Attorney General had found the underlying judgment enforceable.
Due to protracted discussions between the governments of Australia
and the United States, the proposed 1981 bill was not enacted. In its
place, a "Landmark Agreement" 6 on the extraterritorial reach of United
States antitrust laws and judgments was signed by the two
governments.5"
The agreement is broadly framed so as to promote ongoing consulta-
tions on matters of mutual interest. However, affirmative obligations are
imposed upon both governments so as to forestall a reoccurence of the
hostility which frequently arose in the antitrust arena. Specifically, Aus-
tralia may inform the United States of any Australian policy which has
antitrust ramifications for the United States. Similarly, the United States
Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice must inform the
Australian government of any antitrust investigations which offset Aus-
tralian laws, policies or interests. If either government feels that the ac-
tions of the other have antitrust implications, the notified party may re-
quest a consultation to avoid any conflict between the laws, policies or
material interests of the two countries. In the area of litigation, the Aus-
tralian government may request the United States to participate in pri-
vate antitrust proceedings before United States courts when such litiga-
tion involves matters which have been the subject of intergovernmental
consultations. The court must be informed of the substance and outcome
of these negotiations."' Lastly, both governments are to give general re-
54. See Pettit & Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697 (1982).
55. Id. at 711.
56. See 55 AusTL. L.J. 773 (1981).
57. Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation, United States-Australia, June 29, 1982, 21
I.L.M. 702 (1982).
58. Pengilley, Extraterritorial Effects of United States Commercial and Antitrust Leg-
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gard to the interests of the other in the enactment of antitrust laws or
implementation of antitrust policies.
While the agreement resulted in three notifications from the United
States to the Australian government in its first year,5 9 the spectre of hos-
tile "blocking" or "clawback" legislation still exists. Australian Attorney
General Gareth Evans, a sponsor of the proposed 1981 bill,6 ° recently de-
clared that he is "actively considering" whether to recommend that Prime
Minister Hawke's Labor government take further action to protect Aus-
tralian companies from treble damage awards resulting from violations of
United States antitrust laws. 1 Such recommendations are likely to be in
the form of "clawback" legislation to allow Australian firms to recover
part of any such treble damage awards.
Nonetheless, a fragile balance still exists between the two govern-
ments which is very much dependent upon a sustained attitude of com-
munication and cooperation.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion has shown, nations such as Britain and
Australia have begun to implement their opposition to the extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws by American courts through the enact-
ment of blocking statutes. These laws may require a major reassessment
of U.S. antitrust laws by Congress in order to limit the reach of such laws
overseas while still preserving American trading interests in the interna-
tional marketplace.
Anthony J. Carroll
islation: A View from "Down Under", 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 833 (1983).
59. Id. at 885.
60. Interview with Peter Gallegher, Commercial Attache, and David Edward, Chief
Counsel, Australian Embasssy, in Washington, D.C. (August 24, 1983).
61. Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 1269 (June 30, 1983).
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